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Seasonal poverty in Bangladesh, locally known as monga, 
refers to seasonal deprivation of food during the pre-
harvest season of Aman rice. An analysis of household 
income and expenditure survey data shows that average 
household income and consumption are much lower 
during monga season than in other seasons, and that 
seasonal income greatly influences seasonal consumption. 
However, lack of income and consumption smoothing is 
more acute in greater Rangpur, the North West region, 
than in other regions, causing widespread seasonal 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to understand the role of microfinance and other policy interventions to reduce seasonality 
in income and poverty. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The 
author may be contacted at skhandker@worldbank.org.  
deprivation. The analysis shows that agricultural income 
diversification accompanied by better access to micro-
credit, irrigation, education, electrification, social safety 
net programs, and dynamic labor markets has helped 
reduce seasonality in income and poverty in regions other 
than Rangpur in the recent past. Hence, government 
policies should promote income diversification through 
infrastructure investments and provide income transfers 
to the targeted poor to contain income seasonality and 
poverty in this impoverished part of Bangladesh.    
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1.   Introduction 
Smoothing consumption is a major problem for rural households in many agrarian societies.  
There is a large body of literature on seasonality in income, consumption, and poverty.  
Household incomes vary seasonally, often quite sharply.
2  Like income, household 
consumption levels also vary seasonally (Chambers, Longhurst and Pacey 1981; Chaudhuri 
and Paxson (2001); Sahn 1989; Paxson 1993; Dercon and Krishnan 2000).  It is frequently 
asserted that the observed seasonality in consumption is largely driven by the seasonal 
variation in income, and that lack of proper credit markets impedes consumption 
smoothing.  Consumption seasonality may also be pronounced due to non-credit factors 
such as seasonal variation in prices, preferences, labor efforts and precautionary savings 
motives (e.g., Chaudhuri and Paxson 2001; Paxon 1993).
3   
    There is an extensive literature that shows that households adopt a wide range of 
strategies to undo or lessen the adverse affects of seasonality in income – counting on their 
own food and other asset stocks, remittance, receipts from the safety-net programs, selling 
assets, advance sale of labor and/or crops, and borrowing from formal and informal sources, 
etc. (e.g., Alderman and Paxson 1992; Besley 1995; Deaton 1992; Jalan and Ravallion 1999).  
Land fragmentation, storage of grain, accumulation of buffer stock, and mutual insurance 
(provided by family or friends) are some of the traditional risk management devices. Often 
                                                       
2 For example, in the ICRISAT sample of Indian villages used in Chaudhuri and Paxson’s (2001) study, 
agricultural households, on an average, received 75 percent of their annual income in a three-month period.    
3 For instance, Paxson’s (1993) findings suggest that in rural Thailand the observed seasonality in consumption 
patterns results from variation in prices or preferences, which are common to all households, rather than from 
the inability of households to use savings or borrowings to smooth consumption.     
  2these devices can be very costly for households.  Townsend (1995) shows that access to 
financial institutions (banks, credit unions, local money lenders) is important, and can often 
dramatically improve insurance over the traditional insurance mechanisms.  Pitt and 
Khandker (2002) find that micro-credit can help smooth seasonal consumption by financing 
new productive activities whose “income flows and time demands do not seasonally co-vary 
with income generated by existing activities of households.”   
   Indeed, evidence suggests that credit constraints prevent poor households from 
smoothing consumption across seasons and years (Behrman, Foster and Rosenzweig, 1997; 
Harrower and Hoddinott, 2004; Rosenzweig 1988; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Chaudhuri 
and Paxson, 2001).   Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) find that in their efforts to diversify 
risk (e.g., selling livestock) less-wealthy farmers suffer from serious losses of efficiency.  
Informal credit may be still another way to smooth consumption, but this mechanism 
appears to be a costlier one, given its terms, from a household efficiency standpoint, and also 
susceptible to failing completely in the event of an aggregate shock.  A well functioning 
credit market may help avoid the abrupt decline in consumption.
4  Public income transfer is 
another way to reduce the severity of consumption shortfalls (Matin and Hume 2003).   
  Seasonality in income and consumption does not necessarily follow starvation or 
hunger.  Households have alternative ways to smooth consumption and thus avoid 
starvation.  However, when income smoothing does not happen, a failure to smooth 
consumption may result in food shortage and deprivation (Dostie, Haggblade, and 
Randriamamony 2002; Dercon and Krishnan 2000; Muller 1997; Rahman 1995).
5       
                                                       
4 However, a complicating factor is that households may still be able to smooth consumption in the absence of 
properly functioning credit markets (controlling for price and preference) (Chaudhuri and Paxson 2001; 
Deaton 1991; Kazianga and Udry 2006).  Households may do so using mechanisms such as buffer stock or 
interfamily transfers.     
5 In Madagascar, for example, seasonal fluctuation in rice production forces 1 million people to succumb to 
poverty during the lean season (Dostie, Haggblade, and Randriamamony 2002). 
  3Bangladesh is a typical country with pronounced seasonality in income and 
consumption causing sometimes starvation en masses.  Its agricultural sector is characterized 
by three crop seasons, based on three kinds of rice – Aus, Aman and Boro. While these three 
crops cover the whole year, there is a period of virtual economic inactivity during the lean 
period (Rahman 1995).  The non-farm sector is not large enough to employ the unemployed 
who are mostly agricultural laborers or small farmers.
6  
   The greater Rangpur district, the North West part of Bangladesh, experiences most 
seasonal deprivation, or what is commonly known as monga, during the pre-harvest season 
of aman rice.
7  Generally speaking, monga means scarcity of food and other essentials in 
Bangladesh and goes from September to November.  In the greater Rangpur, monga refers to 
seasonal deprivation of food during lean months of the year when households do not have 
adequate employment, income, savings, and, hence, are subject to deprivation of food.
8  
   Part of the inability of households to smooth consumption is due to a severe 
shortage of cash or a lack of access to credit markets.  In the absence of well-functioning 
credit markets, households are frequently drawn to an informal credit market arrangement 
locally known as dadan to smooth consumption. Dadan refers to arrangements whereby 
laborers sell labor or farmers sell crops in advance to smooth consumption during monga.  
The terms often are quite severe to the sellers.   
   Households also adopt means such as distress sale of assets or seasonal migration to 
cope with monga.  People also skip meals when they are unable to manage monga through any 
of the above means.  Households who cannot cope with the severity of shortfalls in income, 
                                                       
6 Besides, non-farm activities are very much linked to farm activities. 
7 The greater Rangpur consists of five districts—Rangpur, Gaibandha, Kurigram, Lalmonirhat, and Nilphamari. 
Monga refers to “mora kartik” in greater Rangpur referring to the months of lean season of September and 
November. 
8 Note that monga does not necessarily mean shortage of food in this part of the country.  It is rather a lack of 
purchasing power, income and employment for a large section of people (Sen 1981).    
  4employment and food are bound to starve for an extended period.  This leads to serious 
malnutrition and death in extreme circumstances.   
   But seasonality in agriculture is a basic fact of agrarian life.  Households must be able 
to adopt effective ways to smooth consumption via income smoothing and other means so 
as to avoid seasonal hunger.  Government policies must come to aid households in need of 
smoothing consumption.  However, when none of these means is effective, a failure to 
smooth consumption results in monga or starvation.  The intensity of monga varies by 
households and local socio-economic conditions and the extent of flood or drought 
preceding the monga period.  Monga is a reflection of not only seasonality of agriculture but 
also a failure of public policies and programs that are expected to mitigate seasonality in 
income and consumption.   
    This paper discusses the extent of seasonality in income, consumption, and food 
deprivation using the nationally representative household income and expenditure surveys 
(HIES) of 2000 and 2005, carried out by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS).  As the 
data are drawn over two periods, this paper will examine the changes in the severity of monga 
in greater Rangpur vis-à-vis other regions of Bangladesh over time.  The paper makes an 
attempt to identify the causes (both seasonal and non-seasonal dimensions) of monga and 
determine possible short- and long-term remedies of seasonal poverty.  An important aspect 
of the policy exercise is to identify the role of targeted programs such as micro-credit and the 
vulnerable group feeding (VGF) program in mitigating monga.
9 
                                                       
9 VGF program, administered by the government, provides food to a select number of households in a 
community that are affected by disasters or during a period when acquiring food is difficult for beneficiary 
households. Priority is given to households with low income, lacking agricultural land or other productive 
assets, day laborers or those headed by women. In a normal year, a distressed household receives 2 to 3 months 
of food rations, with no work or labor participation required. 
  5  The paper is organized as follows.  Section two examines the patterns of seasonality 
in income, consumption and poverty in Bangladesh using the household income and 
expenditure surveys (HIES) of 2000 and 2005.  Section three discusses the model of 
consumption smoothing and its estimation strategy.  Section four presents the results on 
whether income seasonality affects consumption.  Section five presents the results of the 
impacts of income seasonality on poverty.  Section six assesses the impact of policies and 
programs on mitigating seasonality in consumption and poverty.  And lastly, section seven 
summarizes the paper with policy implications.  
    
2.    Household welfare and seasonality in Bangladesh 
Given that Bangladesh is an agrarian economy, the important policy question is: how much 
seasonality in agriculture matters to consumption and income?  If monga is a seasonal poverty 
and only pronounced in greater Rangpur, does it mean that seasonality in agriculture is less 
pronounced in other regions of Bangladesh?  The extent of seasonality in income and 
consumption can be shown through a disaggregate analysis of income and consumption data 
by season.  In HIES surveys, households were interviewed at various times of the year across 
the country.  Consumption and income data were collected, among other information, from 
all households.  For example, income data was collected on crops, non-crop and non-farm 
sources over a year preceding the date of interviews.  Thus, although seasonality in income 
of all types (especially non-farm) could not be traced for alternative seasons, the crop 
income can be sorted out by season because we know which crop is grown during which 
months of the year.  On the other hand, for consumption, it is possible to categorize it by 
season based on the information collected for the week and the month preceding the date of 
  6interview.  Thus, the HIES data can be arranged to show seasonality in income and 
consumption and its consequences in household welfare such as poverty.
10  
  According to the distinct seasonal cycle of agricultural production, we group both 
consumption and income information into 4 seasons in terms of the harvest period of 3 
main crops in Bangladesh—Aus, Aman, and Boro.  The 4 seasons are the Boro (March-
May), Aus (June-August), pre-harvest Aman, which is the monga period (September-
November), and Aman (December-February).
11        
   Figure 1 represents food consumption of rural households based on the HIES of 
2000 and 2005.  In both years, the overall food consumption per capita is much lower in 
Rangpur than the rest of the country, although the level of food consumption has increased 
in greater Rangpur in 2005 compared to the level of 2000.  However, the seasonality in food 
consumption is much more pronounced in Rangpur than in other regions.  Food 
consumption falls sharply during the pre-harvest period (i.e., monga period).  This clearly 
indicates that seasonality in agriculture must result in severe shortfalls in food and, perhaps, 
starvation without recourse to other means to cope with the shortfall. 
12  
                                                       
10 The HIES survey of 2000 included a total sample of 7,440 households of which 5,040 households were 
drawn from rural areas.  In 2005, the rural sample was 6,040 out of a total sample of 10,080 households  This 
paper deals with the rural samples of both surveys.  
 
11 Note that Bangladesh has only 3 seasons based on crop cycle—Aus, Aman, and Boro.  We create another 
season as pre-Aman or monga period o define whether household response behavior differs in pre-Aman 
compared to other seasons.   
12 Seasonal pattern in food consumption may reflect seasonal pattern in prices as well.  In particular, if prices of 
food also fall (due to lower demand, foe example), it is not clear whether lower food consumption reflects 
seasonality in consumption of food quantity or food prices.  For this, we examine patterns of food calorie 
intake (not shown here), which follows a similar seasonal pattern as food consumption.   
  7 
Figure 1: Monthly food consumption by season 
 
 Sources: HIES surveys, 2002 and 2005.     
 
Since consumption is falling at a similar rate across Rangpur and other regions, 
consumption, however, seems to remain lower even after monga in Rangpur as compared to 
the rest of the country.  That is, the ability of rural households to recover from a sharp 
decline in consumption after the monga period is greater for the rest of the country than in 
Rangpur.  In any case, the sharp decline in consumption during the lean season must be a 
major cause of widespread seasonal food deprivation or monga at least in Rangpur in 2005.   
   Food consumption is cyclical in response to crop seasonality in agriculture, and, 
hence, income.  Because many rural households depend on income from crops, their income 
is likely to be seasonal.
13  Consider now the seasonality in income calculated based on the 
                                                       
13 Food consumption is based on consumption during the weeks and months preceding the interview, and 
since households interviewed were distributed over a year, seasonality can be captured from the inter-
household variation in food consumption, as opposed to intra-household variation.  Income data, on the other 
hand, refers to the income of the entire year and therefore does not reflect seasonality.  However, a seasonal 
variation can be detected in income by identifying households’ income from crop production. Crop production 
  8crops grown by households and the timing of their harvests.  Crop income is added to 
income from other sources to obtain total per capita income.  Figure 2 shows seasonality in 
both total income and total consumption per capita.  It shows that income, especially crop 
income, is very much seasonal and follows a similar pattern of seasonality as consumption.  
The income of Rangpur is much lower as well as more seasonal than that of other regions.  
Like consumption, per capita income falls sharply during the monga period in Rangpur.  
There is seasonality in income of other regions but it is less pronounced compared to 
Rangpur.   
  There is a distinct pattern of income and consumption seasonality in Rangpur and 
other regions.  As shown in figure 2, although food consumption, on an average, is far below 
the monthly income in all regions, total income falls short of total consumption during the 
monga period in both regions.  More strikingly, however, in greater Rangpur the income falls 
short of consumption during other seasons as well, particularly during pre- monga and to 
some extent in the post monga period.   
  The fact that seasonality influences household’s consumption does not mean that 
seasonal poverty will result as a consequence.  Similarly, even if consumption smoothing 
varies by region, it does not tell us how much poverty is actually caused by seasonality (either 
idiosyncratic or aggregate).  More specifically, as shown in Figure 2, we do not know how 
many households cannot smooth consumption and thus fall into seasonal hunger or poverty.   
                                                                                                                                                               
in Bangladesh is seasonal and diverse across households.  Since, HIES collected households’ crop income by 
specific crop, it is possible to calculate the share of households’ seasonal crop income to total income. 
  9 
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This requires an examination of household poverty against seasonal income and 
consumption data to find out the extent of poverty in a particular season.     
   We propose that seasonality affects household’s ability to maintain a minimum 
livelihood.  A decrease in seasonal income lowers household’s consumption.  It lowers 
consumption enough to force many households down below poverty level.  The question is 
how many rural households experience seasonal hunger during the lean season.  
  We consider three poverty indicators and their seasonal variations: moderate poverty, 
food poverty and extreme poverty.  A household is considered moderate poor if its per 
capita expenditure (food and non-food) is less than the total poverty line established for the 
region as defined in Table 1.
14  Similarly, a household is considered food-poor if its per 
                                                       
14 Table 1 shows regional food and total poverty lines for 2000 and 2005.  It illustrates that the living 
expenditure in the Rangpur region is less than that in rest of the country, after adjusting for the consumer price 
index.  It also shows that there has been very little increase in the poverty lines between 2000 and 2005.    
  10capita food consumption is less than the food poverty line established for the region.
15  
Extreme or hard-core poverty is on the other hand usually characterized by a situation when 
a household, with combined expenditure on food and nonfood, cannot match the food 
poverty line, let alone the total poverty line. So, extreme poverty indicates a dire economic 
situation, much worse than food poverty. 
16  
  Table 2 reports the distribution of moderate, food and extreme poverty for rural 
households, disaggregated by region and season, for 2000 and 2005. There are four basic 
trends observed from these poverty figures.  First, the poverty situation is worse in the 
Rangpur region than in the rest of the country.  Second, the poverty situation is worse 
during the monga period than during the non-monga periods.  Thirdly, the poverty situation 
improves from 2000 to 2005. Finally, the gap in poverty status between the monga and non-
monga periods is larger in the Rangpur region than in rest of the country, which is consistent 
with our earlier finding that consumption seasonality in the Rangpur region is higher than 
that in other regions. For example, the gap is about 12 percentage points for food poverty in 
the Rangpur region in 2005, whereas it was 7 percentage points in the rest of the country.  
                                                       
15 Food poverty line is calculated by estimating the cost of a food basket needed to maintain the per capita daily 
caloric requirement (2112 calories) recommended by FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization). Since, 
household’s food consumption calculated from HIES data refers to the consumption during the prior month’s 
interview, the calculated food poverty is monthly and, hence, seasonal.     
16 The question may arise whether poverty figures represent any role of seasonal dimension.  Note that 
consumption aggregates, the basis for poverty calculation, include both food and non-food.  However,, more 
than 80 percent of total expenses comprise of food expenses.  The information on food and some non-food 
expenses is drawn weekly and monthly data and hence, displays seasonality.  But some non-food expenses are 
drawn from yearly data.  However, to the extent that the non-food expenses do not vary much across seasons, 
the poverty (either moderate or extreme) figures would display seasonality primarily driven by seasonality in 
food consumption.   
  11 
Figure 3: Food and extreme poverty by season (2005) 
 
 Sources: HIES survey 2005 
     
   Now take a closer look at the seasonal trends of these poverty indices in 2005.  In 
figure 3 above, the year of 2005 is broken down into three seasons, as has been done for two 
earlier figures.  The pattern in food poverty is similar in Rangpur and the other regions – it 
continuously increases and peaks during the monga season before declining in the post-monga 
season.  The trend for extreme poverty is almost similar for the rest of the country.  
However, in the Rangpur region extreme poverty decreases during the pre-monga season and 
afterwards rises continuously, even during the post-monga season.  This implies that although 
households in the Rangpur region manage to reduce their food deprivation during the post-
monga period, their total consumption goes down, which is possible only if their non-food 
consumption falls significantly.   
  12   However, monga is perhaps more than seasonality of income and poverty in greater 
Rangpur.  A World Bank study shows that the greater Rangpur was the most lagging region 
in Bangladesh in 2005 in terms of poverty reduction ((Narayan, Yoshida and Zaman 2007).   
This is indeed echoed in Table 3.  In 2005, for example, greater Rangpur had a rural poverty 
rate in 2005 as high as 61 percent compared to only 45.1 percent poverty at the national level 
Extreme poverty was as high as 47.9 percent compared to the national rural average of 31.1 
percent.  Although Rangpur experienced a greater reduction of poverty over time (say 
between 2000 and 2005), the region is still lagging compared to the rest of the country in 
term of overall poverty figures.   
   More importantly, the Rangpur region is lagging in terms of other socio-economic 
indicators of household and community –level welfare.  For example, household per capita 
income in Rangpur was about two-thirds of that in the rest of the country and this 
proportional share has remained constant over the years (Table 4).  Households of greater 
Rangpur drew income more from farm than non-farm sources, thereby being more 
vulnerable to seasonality of agriculture.  Greater Rangpur is also lagging in terms of access to 
credit and other infrastructures.  More households draw wage income from agriculture in 
Rangpur (13.5 percent) than in the rest of the country (9.4 percent).  However, agricultural 
wage workers fare worse in Rangpur than their counterparts in the rest of the country.  For 
example, in 2005, the daily real wage rate for male agricultural workers in Rangpur was only 
46 Taka compared to 64 Taka in the rest of country.
17  
  
                                                       
17 The higher wage rate in rest of the country reflects of a much more integrated wage market with outside the 
region which may reflect a higher rate of out-migration, implying an active shortage of labor with consequential 
higher wage rates.   
  13 
3.   Testing lack of income and consumption smoothing: Estimation strategy 
Having shown the extent of seasonality in income, consumption and poverty, the next issues 
are: How much seasonality of income matters in seasonal variations of consumption and 
poverty? How much seasonal fluctuation in consumption and poverty is structural, making 
households incapable of managing seasonality efficiently?
18  Given the large body of 
literature which indicates that perfect consumption smoothing is possible even in the 
presence of a binding credit and other constraints, we need to estimate a consumption 
smoothing model to determine the extent of the role of income seasonality or lack of 
income smoothing in consumption and poverty.   
Following Paxson (1993) and Deaton (1997), consider that the outcome variable Cijs 
(the per capita consumption expenditure of household i in village j in season s) would 
depend on total per capita income (Y) and its seasonal shares (y) (this is essentially seasonal 
income), seasonal dummies, prices and preferences.  Despite the fact that income data is 
subject to a measurement error (Deaton 1997), this income-consumption model is a 
standard model used to estimate the impact of income seasonality in consumption (e.g, 
Paxson 1993; Kazianga and Udry 2006)).  Consider the following consumption equation in 
semi-logarithm form, conditional on total income (Y) and seasonal crop income shares (y): 
ijs j ij ij ijs ij s ijs X y Y C               2 1 ln ln   (3.1) 
where is a vector of household and village level characteristics (including prices) 
influencing consumption and income,  and   is seasonal dummies representing the 
ij X
s 
                                                       
18 The first question relates to finding the extent of idiosyncratic shock, while the second question refers to the 
aggregate shock on consumption and poverty.  Policies to address them will differ by the severity of each type 
of shock.   
  14seasons.
19    is a mean zero disturbance term that reflects unmeasured determinants of Cijs  
that vary across households.  Note also that household consumption is affected by 
unobserved household heterogeneity (
ijs 
ij  ) and village heterogeneity ( j  ).  
    If 0 2   , seasonality is not an issue and seasonal income does not track seasonal 
consumption with possible household’s ability to smooth consumption through self-
insurance and other mechanisms.  That is, seasonal consumption depends entirely on overall 
income and not on seasonal income.  Households are thus able to draw resources from 
alternative sources to compensate for losses in income, if any, during a particular season to 
maintain the level of consumption.  This is a case of perfect consumption smoothing model.  
   In contrast, when 0 2   , we have a case of lack of consumption smoothing.  Under 
this scenario, either of the following emerges. (i)  2 1    .  This means that seasonal income 
relative to total income exceeds consumption in a given season. That is, a greater fraction of 
seasonal crop income relative to total income is saved for managing consumption smoothing 
(Deaton 1997).  (ii)  2 1    . This indicates that households spend more than seasonal 
income relative to total income.   This is possible for the following reasons: Households may 
draw income from non-crop or non-farm sources not included in total income or resort to 
distress sale of assets, or advance sale of labor and crop or family and intra-family transfers 
to augment income in a particular season to avoid starvation.   
   A major problem with the estimation of equation (3.1) is the joint distribution of 
income and consumption because of the presence of the errors ( and ).  There is 
substantial evidence for joint causation between income and consumption (Strauss 1986; 
                                                       
19 It is assumed that the sample is uniformly distributed over the entire year, with enough observations from all 
seasons to carry out the analysis.  For example, the distribution of 7,640 households sampled in 2005 HIES 
survey include 27% in season one, 22% households in season 2, 27% in season three, and 24% in season 4.    
  15Strauss and Thomas 1995).  More specifically, there are measurement errors in both income 
and consumption.  For example, measurement errors in consumption are likely to be 
correlated with measurement errors in income, which would tend to induce an attenuation 
factor that biases coefficients towards zero (Deaton, 1997; Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997).  
In this case, even household panel does not help; we need to instrument income.    
   The instruments for income (Y) and its seasonal shares (y) can be the production 
constraints such as rainfall and a productive environment such as irrigation potential.  The 
labor market clearing wages are also assumed to influence only income and not consumption 
directly.  These variables are represented by the vector (M).  Here we rely on the assumption 
of perfect substitutability model of income and consumption with an active labor market to 
justify the instrumental variable (IV) method (Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 1986).   
























ijs M X y                             (3.3) 
  A test of perfect consumption smoothing is carried out using the HIES of 2000 and 
2005.  The focus of analysis is to estimate a consumption model to demonstrate the extent 
of the net effect of income seasonality on consumption.
20 
Even with IV method based on cross-section data we will encounter another 
problem.  That is, when we relate seasonal consumption to seasonality of income and non-
income factors even after controlling for joint determination of income and consumption, 
we invariably introduce a common season effect such as seasonal shock that affects both 
                                                       
20 Calculation of seasonal share of income from HIES data is done as follows.  Household income was 
reported for the entire year and not by season in HIES. However, household’s annual income from crop 
cultivation was disaggregated by season, because, barring few exceptions, crop type varies by season, and 
knowing the crops that a household cultivate we tracked its crop income down to a season. So, it’s the share of 
seasonal crop income we used to proxy for income seasonality. This is a reasonable assumption, given that crop 
income fluctuation is the root cause of income seasonality in Bangladesh.          
  16seasonal income and consumption.  That is, it is possible that a common seasonal shock 
influences all households to behave in a certain manner, independent of household and 
village heterogeneity.  For example, household consumption may be completely independent 
of seasonal variations in income and still co-vary with seasonal income, simply because of 
common season-specific shock.   
   Introducing seasonal dummies in the regression of (3.1) does not resolve this 
problem.  Nor an introduction of a village fixed effects method can solve this either, as 
common seasonal effect affects all households equally in a village.  This requires us to 
introduce a common seasonal model which requires seasonal panel data (i.e., repeated 
observations across seasons).  Recall that cross-sectional data of 2000 and 2005 do not form 
panel either at the household or village level, but they provide a cross-section of 
households/villages interviewed across seasons over two years.  In this case, one constructs 
a panel of seasons at the thana level if not at the village level with different households 
interviewed over two seasons.  Thana is thus the lowest common sampling units that can 
help create the panel across seasons.  The common seasonal effect at the thana level ( ) sj  is 
therefore an aggregate shock observed at the thana level that affects equally all households 
living in a particular thana.  We propose, therefore, to use a thana level fixed effects method 
with panel seasonal data to control for the common seasonal shock.
21  In other words, let us 
rewrite the equation (3.1) as follows: 
ijst j sj ij ijt ijst ijt st ijst X y Y C                 2 1 ln ln    (3.4) 
where  sj   is unobserved thana-level common seasonal shock, j stands for thana instead of 
village and t is year.  Similarly, equations (3.2) and (3.3) will include a seasonal thana-specific 
                                                       
21 The ideal panel could be at the household level, meaning the same households were interviewed in different 
seasons over two years.   
  17common shock ( sj  ).  In estimating (3.4) we apply a thana-level fixed-effects instrumental 
variable method (call it FE-IV) to eliminate bias due to unobserved thana-level common 
seasonal shock affecting the consumption and income variations, as well as controlling for 
the joint distribution of income and consumption due to time in-varying unobserved errors 
observed at the household and thana level .
22   
  One potential problem of estimating equation (3.4) is bias due to attrition of some 
thanas from the thana level fixed-effects analysis.  As indicated, the HIES data sets of 2000 
and 2005 are not meant to be panel even at the thana level.  Out of a total of 504 thanas in 
Bangladesh, there were 250 thanas included in the survey year of 2000 and 291 thanas in 
2005.  When we merge the data at the thana level over two years, we get a common set of 
184 thanas to be included in the thana level panel.
23    
Thus, altogether 66 out of 250 thanas from 2000 survey were not available for panel 
analysis, implying an attrition rate of 26.4 percent. Attrition can bias estimates where it is 
nonrandom or selective. In that case, it may well ruin the advantages that seasonal panel data 
analysis is supposed to have and cross-sectional data may be a better choice. There is a large 
body of literature that demonstrates that even a high attrition rate is a non-issue as long as it 
is random (Alderman and others 2000; Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt 1998; Thomas, 
Frankenberg and Smith 2001; Ziliak and Kniesner 1998).  For example, Fitzgerald, 
                                                       
22 In practice, what we do is the following.  First, we multiply thana dummy with seasonal dummy to create 
thana-season dummy.  Since we have two seasons (monga and non-monga), the difference between these 
thana-season dummies cancels out season-specific unobserved effect within a thana ( sj  ).  Since these thana-
season dummies are also observed in two years, the difference between them in two years cancels out thana-
specific fixed effect ( j  ).  Yet there is a possibility that household-level heterogeneity which cannot be 
cancelled out in this process may be included in thana-level heterogeneity, part of which can vary over time.  
Therefore, we use an IV method to take care of this time-varying heterogeneity.  The IVs are the rainfall and 
other production constraints that affect only the household production and not the consumption directly. As 
before, we will include predicted total and seasonal income shares in estimating equation (3.4).   
23 Note that the reduced samples for the thana level panel data consists of 5,040 households with 25% in 
season 1, 23% in season two, 27% in season three, and 25% in season 4.  
  18Gottschalk and Moffitt (1998) found from Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) that households with lower earnings, lower educational levels and lower marriage 
propensities are more prone to attrition. Their dataset had a high 50 percent attrition rate, 
still they found that there is no relationship between attrition rate and magnitude of attrition 
bias and that even large attrition causes unbiased estimation if attrition is random.  
   One can formally test if attrition biases estimates, namely, if reduced sample size 
because of attrition matters in our estimation.  The issue we would like to investigate is, what 
are the determinants of thana attrition and to what extent attrition biases the estimates?  We 
carry out a formal test for attrition bias. We regress per capita consumption of 2000 on the 
exogenous X-variables (age, sex and education of household head, maximum education of 
household’s adult males and females, and so on), attrition dummy (meaning 1 for those 
thanas which were absent in 2005 and 0 otherwise) and attrition dummy interacted with X-
variables.  Since our purpose is to determine whether coefficients of the explanatory 
variables differ for those thanas that were dropped from 2005, we will perform a joint 
significant test (F-test) of the attrition dummy and its interaction variables.  A similar fit will 
be made for the HIES survey of 2005, where attrition dummy includes the thanas excluded 
in 2000 HIES survey.  
 
4.   Does income seasonality affect consumption? 
This section discusses the results of the impact of income seasonality on consumption.  
Table 5 presents summary statistics of the outcome and explanatory variables.    As Table 5 
shows, most welfare indicators – both at household and village levels – improve from 2000 
to 2005.  For simplicity, the country is divided into two regions—greater Rangpur and the 
rest of the country.  Although seasonal shares of crop income capture seasonality of 
  19agriculture, we also include a seasonal dummy (1 for lean season, and 0 otherwise) by 
assuming that there is a common non-crop seasonality that also matters for consumption 
variations across seasons.
24  
Table 6 presents the results with two-model specifications (one for total per capita 
consumption and the other for per capita food consumption).  The results are reported with 
cross-sectional data for 2000 and 2005.  First, we estimate the first stage of income equations 
of (3.2) and (3.3) (reported in appendix table A1) and use the predicted values in equation 
(3.1) to estimate the influence of predicted income and its seasonal crop shares on seasonal 
consumption per capita.  We test the endogeneity of income and its seasonal share to justify 
the two-stage IV model.
25  The Hausman endogeneity test results (table 6) show that the 
two-stage technique is a valid strategy to estimate the consumption model.     
Next, we consider the role of seasonal income shares in consumption, conditional on 
overall yearly income, for the cross-sectional estimates of 2000 and 2005.  We do find that 
the coefficient of seasonal income shares is statistically significant and different from zero, at 
least in 2005.  That is, our results reject the model of perfect consumption smoothing.  In 
other words, seasonal crop income tracks seasonal consumption (both food and total 
consumption) significantly – a clear case of lack of consumption smoothing.  Although per 
capita consumption is determined by overall income, it can also depend on its seasonal 
shares.  For example, in 2005, a 10 percent increase in total income raises per capita food 
consumption by 2.1 percentage points while a similar percentage increase in seasonal crop 
income share raises food consumption by 17.0 percentage points.  Note that this is 
                                                       
24 This two-way classification of the country or the year is an attempt to highlight the differences between 
monga and non-monga periods or between Rangpur and the rest of the country.  Note that Rangpur belongs to 
Rajshahi division, which is one of 6 divisions of Bangladesh. Similarly, there are 4 distinct seasons but we are 
collapsing 4 seasons into only 2 seasons.    
25Appendix Table A shows complete first stage estimates of income equations.  
  20independent of any other type of seasonality or imperfections (for instance, individual 
preferences or labor and product market imperfections) that may cause variations in 
consumption.   
  Can the finding of a lack of consumption smoothing be maintained with seasonal 
panel analysis where we control for bias due to common seasonal and aggregate income 
shock?  Consider the seasonal panel data analysis of equation (3.4).  As indicated, 
constructing thana level panel will invariably loses a few thanas as the HIES data collection 
over the survey periods of 2000 and 2005 is not meant to be even at the thana level.   
Therefore, a test of attrition bias for losing thanas in panel data analysis is done.  The test 
results are shown in table 7.  From the results we see that at 1 percent level, the null 
hypothesis of excluded thanas is the same as the included thanas cannot be rejected for both 
survey periods. Thus, we do not think attrition bias is an issue for the study and, therefore, 
we overlooked this issue in our estimation of thana-level panel data. In a panel household 
study, Ziliak and Kniesner (1998) reached the same conclusion, “…nonrandom attrition is 
of little concern …, because the effect of attrition is absorbed into the fixed-effects”.      
  The FE-IV estimates of equation (3.4) are shown by the last two columns of table 6.  
The FE-IV estimates confirm that crop income seasonality still matters in consumption.  For 
example, a 10 percent increase in seasonal crop income shares increases household’s per 
capita total consumption by 16.6 percent and food consumption by 11.9 percent 
respectively.  The results also confirm that households spend more than seasonal shares of 
total income to support consumption.   This perhaps suggests that households either draw 
income from non-crop sources not included in seasonal income or resort to distress and 
advance sale of labor, crop, or assets or to inter-family transfers not reported in income data 
to smooth consumption.    
  21  Overall, the evidence suggests that changes in seasonal consumption track seasonal 
income, implying that households are unable to smooth consumption with crop income 
across seasons.  This contradicts the null hypothesis of perfect consumption smoothing.  
The evidence is consistent with the findings from other countries as well (e.g., Kazianga and 
Udry 2006).
26  This finding supports that idiosyncratic shock matters in rural income and 
consumption.     
Given that seasonal income matters, the next question is – does it matter more in 
Rangpur than in the rest of the country?  Also when the common non-crop-income 
seasonality is measured by the monga dummy, does it matter in seasonal variations in 
consumption and does it matter more in Rangpur than in other regions?  To address such 
issues, we modify equation (3.4) by adding 4 more variables: a seasonal dummy, a regional 
dummy (1 for greater Rangpur and 0 elsewhere), a seasonal share of income interacted with 
regional dummy, and the seasonal dummy interacted with the regional dummy.  Note that 
the interaction term between seasonal and regional dummies represents an aggregate 
seasonal shock at the regional level as opposed to idiosyncratic shock as measured at 
household level by crop income shares.
27  In other words, we would like to test if 
idiosyncratic and aggregate consumption risks are greater in Rangpur than in other regions. 
We also introduce an interaction term of year and regional dummy to measure whether 
consumption growth differs by region.  Table 6 also illustrates the results.
28   
                                                       
26 This finding contradicts the findings of Paxson (1993) for Thailand and those of Jacoby and Skoufias (1998) 
for India.   
27 See Jalan and Ravallion (1999).  Alternatively, the aggregate shock could be measured by the village-level 
interaction terms with year or the average village consumption.  This requires, however, household-level panel 
data, which we do not have.    
28 Besides the total and share of seasonal income, the interaction term between seasonal share and the Rangpur 
region is treated as endogenous in these estimations, which makes the observed t-statistics in the second stage 
biased. This bias has been corrected by bootstrapping the regressions. 
  22   As table 6 suggests, the impact of income seasonality (at least for food consumption) 
is more pronounced in Rangpur than in other regions.  This is captured by the interaction 
term of seasonal income with the regional dummy.  Thus, the impact of crop income 
seasonality in food consumption is 3 times higher in greater Rangpur than in the rest of 
Bangladesh.  The finding suggests that idiosyncratic income risk is much more pronounced 
in Rangpur than in other regions.   
The non-crop-income seasonality as captured by monga dummy influences both 
food and total consumption.
29  Thus, food consumption is lower during the monga (i.e., lean) 
than other periods.  For example, a household’s per capita food consumption decreased by 
2.7 percentage points.  Paradoxically, total consumption is at least 4 percent higher during 
the lean period than other periods.  However, the negative food consumption effect of 
monga is much higher in greater Rangpur than in other regions.  Therefore, households 
living in greater Rangpur suffer more from idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.  Seasonality 
of consumption is therefore more than income seasonality in greater Rangpur.   
   Surprisingly, this is despite the fact that the greater Rangpur region experiences a 
higher food consumption growth than other regions, as measured by the coefficient of the 
interaction term between year and regional dummy.  Although consumption grew in all 
regions over the years, it grew at a higher rate in Rangpur than in other regions (at least for 
food consumption).  But even if consumption grew at a higher rate, households still cannot 
cope with seasonality in income to smooth consumption in Rangpur as efficiently as in other 
areas of Bangladesh.                    
        
5.  Does income seasonality affect poverty?    
                                                       
29 The seasonal dummy may also capture the seasonal variation in non-crop income as the total includes yearly 
income received from all sources such as income from non-crop and non-agricultural sources.  
  23With evidence of lack of consumption smoothing, we now ask: Does income seasonality 
affect all households equally, or does it vary depending on the level of poverty?  Following 
Jalan and Ravallion (1999), a panel estimation regression (3.4) is run separately for poor and 
non-poor households.  
   Table 8 reports the results. Crop income seasonality affects everybody, although the 
magnitude seems to vary between poor and non-poor households.  We test the coefficients 
of seasonality for equality between poor and non-poor households, and the chi-square test 
indicates that the coefficients vary significantly by all types of poverty status for per capita 
total consumption, and by food poverty only for food consumption. That is, income 
seasonality is much less pronounced for non-poor than poor households.  In other words, 
consumption of non-poor households is much more insured against income shocks than 
that of poor households consistent with other studies (e.g., Jalan and Ravallion 1999).
30   
The above analysis, however, does not deal with the question of whether income 
seasonality affects poverty itself.  If a lack of consumption smoothing is a major hurdle for 
many households, particularly among the poor, we expect that income seasonality would also 
affect the incidence of poverty.  In fact, we have seen in section 2 that just like consumption 
poverty is sensitive to seasonality as well.  To estimate the effect of seasonality on poverty, 
we follow two procedures: (i) We estimate the probability of a household’s being in poverty 
against seasonal income a la equation (3.1) and (3.4); and (ii) we calculate the changes in 
poverty status based on the consumption estimates of equation (3.4) as reported in table 6.   
Unlike consumption in equation (3.1), for example, the poverty is binary and hence, 
the equation is non-linear.  However, for practical reasons, we used a FE-IV method to 
                                                       
30 Such a comparison is not truly meaningful, as consumption and poverty are jointly determined.  Later we will 
treat seasonality in the context of poverty itself.  Also note that as seasonality does not vary much by moderate 
poverty, we will focus on seasonality in the context of only food and extreme poverty.  
  24estimate the linear probability of whether the household is poor in a given season.
31  
Consider the following equation to estimate the poverty incidence. 
          (5.1)   ijst j sj ij ijt ijst ijt st t ijst X y Y Z C                  2 1 ln ) Pr(
Here Pr measures the probability of consumption falling below the poverty threshold (Z).   
As before, we used a FE-IV method to estimate the linear probability model with predicted 
values of total income (Y) and seasonal income shares (y).  The estimates of poverty effects 
of income seasonality following equation (5.1) are shown in Table 9.   
   Estimates suggest that total overall income is a major cause of both food and 
extreme poverty.  According to FE-IV estimates, a 10 percent increase in total per capita 
income reduces food poverty by 1.9 percentage points and extreme poverty by 4.3 
percentage points.  Seasonal income shares affect poverty in a much more pronounced way.  
For example, a 10 percent increase in seasonal crop income shares can reduce food poverty 
by 9.2 percentage points and extreme poverty by as much as 13.2 percentage points.  The 
substantive negative relationship between poverty and income seasonality indicates that 
seasonal income tracks seasonal poverty, making income seasonality a major cause of 
seasonal poverty.   
  Are these poverty estimates much different from those estimated using the second 
procedure?  We follow the second procedure where we calculate the poverty effects using 
the consumption estimates of table 6.  This essentially means we implement the following 
method:  
     ) / )( / ( / y C C P y P                 (5.2), 
                                                       
31 We use this linear two-stage fixed-effects method instead of the two-stage fixed-effects logit because FE-logit 
loses a lot of observation. Nonetheless, the linear probability estimates are asymptotically consistent.  
  25where P indicates poverty measure.  That is, given the consumption estimates of table 6, we 
calculate the likely consumption changes due to seasonality of income.  Given the estimated 
consumption changes, we estimate how much poverty changes are likely due to changes in 
seasonal income shocks.  The changes in poverty using this procedure are shown in table 10.  
The results clearly confirm that there is a negative impact of income seasonality on all 
measures of poverty, meaning seasonality in income affects poverty negatively.  However, 
the calculated poverty effects of seasonality using the consumption estimates are lower than 
those obtained with a linear poverty model.
32 For example, a 10 percent increase in seasonal 
crop income can reduce food poverty by 9.2 percentage points as per the direct poverty 
estimates of Table 9 compared to only 1.8 percentage points as shown in Table 10.  The 
magnitude varies considerably but the direction of change is the same.       
   The linear probability model of poverty shows the role of aggregate shock besides 
the role of idiosyncratic shock on poverty.  It shows that seasonality in crop income is not a 
major factor causing poverty in Rangpur.  This is demonstrated by the interaction terms of 
seasonal income shares and the region dummy.    
   But non-income seasonality plays an independent role in causing high incidences of 
food poverty.  For example, food poverty is higher during the monga season by at least 3.4 
percentage points.  The interaction of the Rangpur region and the monga period is 
significantly negative for extreme poverty, suggesting that aggregate shock negatively affects 
extreme poverty more in Rangpur than other areas.  Therefore, poverty is not so much due 
to idiosyncratic shock.  Aggregate shock also matters a lot causing seasonal deprivation, 
remaining a major challenge in greater Rangpur for reducing seasonal hunger and chronic 
poverty.    
                                                       
32 The difference could be attributed to the linearization of a non-linear model.    
  26 
6.     Policies to mitigate seasonality in income and poverty     
What could be done to mitigate seasonal deprivation as persistent and widespread as in 
Rangpur?  The basic hypothesis is that since seasonal poverty is caused by both idiosyncratic 
and aggregate shocks, which also affect chronic poverty (where chronic poverty in turn 
affects seasonal hunger and poverty), the mitigating policies must be broad-based as well as 
targeted.  The broad-based policies could be, for example, infrastructural development 
programs that help promote overall income growth, and hence, income diversification.  In 
contrast, targeted policies such as food for work (FFW) and vulnerable group feeding (FGF) 
could target the vulnerable households during the lean season.   
 In  practice,  as  monga is determined by the interactions of income and non-income 
factors characterizing a rural economy, we must understand how certain regions such as 
greater Rangpur differs from other regions in terms of accessing public policies and 
programs.  We already observed that households in non-Rangpur districts increasingly draw 
relatively more income from non-farm sources, including remittances, than farm sources 
than those living in Rangpur region.  The non-Rangpur districts are also better endowed 
with resources that created improved access to formal credit, electricity, and a dynamic labor 
market.
33   
   This raises a basic question of why policies differ by region.  One may hypothesize 
that the underlying reasons for the differences in policy and program placement across 
regions are differential agroclimatic endowments and location factors characterizing a region.  
This is because these factors determine agricultural and other opportunities of a region, 
                                                       
33 A labor market is dynamic when real wage grows over time.  This has actually happened in areas other than 
Rangpur parlty because of diffusion of modern farm technology and rural non-farm income expansion in 
conjunction with net out-migration.  
  27thereby affecting both public and private investments (Binswanger, Khandker, and 
Rosenzweig 1993).  In other words, agroclimatic endowments influencing returns to public 
and private investments must be poorer in greater Rangpur than other regions.  This is why 
public investments in roads, markets, irrigation, and banks are lower in Rangpur and thus, 
affect adversely the incidence of seasonality in income, consumption, and poverty.   
  The question is -- how public policies and programs are to respond to the 
underlying factors causing the high incidence of seasonality in income and consumption, and 
hence, poverty.  The paper’s aim is to determine the mechanisms through which a range of 
infrastructure and credit policies have contributed to growth in total income and its seasonal 
shares, and also whether these policies have led to significant reduction of seasonal and 
chronic poverty.   
   This is equivalent to running a reduced-form equation where the consumption or 
poverty is expressed as a function of all price and non-price exogenous policy (e.g., public 
infrastructural and credit-related investments) variables (M) affecting both income and 
consumption, thereby poverty.
34  By substituting income equations (3.2) and (3.3) into 
consumption equation (3.4) and after suppressing seasonal effects, we get the following 
reduced-form consumption equation: 
              (6.1)  ijt j ij jt ijt t ijt M X C              ln
But public infrastructural and credit-related investments are not random; rather, 
these public investments are directly influenced by agroclimatic and other local area 
endowments, which also affect the agricultural and non-agricultural opportunities in a given 
thana or a village.  Better-endowed thanas/villages might be likely targets in some instances 
(for example, public investments in roads may seek areas with better terrain and earnings 
                                                       
34 Note that M consists of the rainfall, productive environmental factors and wages that were considered as 
instruments for the 1st stage regression of income equations presented in appendix table 1. 
  28potential), whereas other investments such as safety net programs may target poorly 
endowed areas.  Furthermore, local agroclimatic characteristics are also likely to be highly 
correlated with other potentially unobserved community features that could affect program 
placement, such as local political influence proxied by the distance of the village from a 
thana head quarter (Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig 1993).   
Agroclimatic and location factors can be measured ( j) and unmeasured ( j  ).  
Given the rural context of the samples, ( j) can be characterized by soil quality, flood 
potential, temperature, sunshine, and related factors affecting the earnings opportunities of 
the locality.
35  Other village/thana locational variables, it R , including variation in annual 
rainfall, can also affect village-level policy characteristics, jt . Along with a time-specific 
error term, 
 M
 jt, this relationship can be specified additively as follows: 
  jt j jt j jt R M            2 1 0  (6.2) 
Household outcomes,  according to equatio  capita 
expend ese
handker and Rosenzweig (1993) study shows, when both public 
policies and private investments are jointly determined by the same agroclimate and location 
                                                     
ijt C , n (6.1), such as per
iture are affected by th  agroclimate endowments and resulting policies.  Such 
interactions make it difficult to identify the precise role of infrastructure and other policy 
initiatives on income, expenditure, and poverty.  Observed and unobserved village/thana 
endowments as well as income earning opportunities determine jointly both household and 
policy interventions, and hence, household level income and poverty.  Unobserved 
heterogeneity at the thana/village level may therefore affect both the outcomes of interest 
and program placement.   
As Binswanger, K
 
35 Agroclimatic data were obtained from the Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council’s website, 
http://www.barc.gov.bd/Data_Stat.htm .  
  29factors,
he agroclimatic variables
 we need a panel data set to use a fixed-effects method to estimate the impacts of 
policies on private investments and outcomes of interest.  In our case, we will use the thana 
level panel data to resolve the bias due to joint determination of program placement and 
outcomes of interest such as income and consumption.
36 
   Regarding the specific question of how to treat program placement, one problem 
with estimating equation (6.2) is that the direct impact of t   j and 
 j cannot be determined.  We could estimate these effects if the policy investments (M) 
were not a function of the unobserved agroclimatic variables,  j.  This would be th ase if
 observed set of agroclimatic variables 
e c  
the  j completely represented the set of local area 
endowments affecting placement of infrastructure and credit programs, and thus  j could 
be treated as random.  In this case, a rando -effects estimation of equation (6.2) is valid.  
We conduct Wu-Hausman test, specifying the unobserved effect as the vector of local 
agroclimatic characteristics, to see whether the fixed-effects or random-effects specification




imatic conditions on infrastructure, school, and credit interventions Effects of agrocl  
ollowing equation (6.2) described above, Table 11 presents the FE results for the effects of 
tics) on 
                                                     
F
local agroclimatic conditions (interacted with year to obtain time-varying characteris
program placement. The Wu-Hausman tests indicate that the fixed-effects model is 
appropriate for explaining variation in these policies over time, and therefore only the fixed-
effects estimates are reported.  Table 11 shows that agroclimatic endowments explain as 
 
36 Even if some policy variables are measured at the village level, public investments are truly made at the thana 
level.  Thus, if a particular thana receives funds for certain public investments, the village is likely to receive the 
same investment, and not the other way around.  Hence, a thana-level fixed-effect is appropriate to measure 
the impacts of public policies. 
  30much as 37 percent of variation in the growth of electrification, irrigation, microfinance 
institutions and other variables over the period.  There are many potential ways to interpret 
the direction of the impacts of agroclimatic variation on these interventions.    
   As Table 11 shows, while electrification is inversely related to proximity to thana 
headquarter, substantial variation exists in the effects of local area endowments across 
policies.  Flood potential has a detrimental effect on finance expansion over the period, for 
example, whereas school expansion has targeted areas with less flood potential.  Medium-
highland areas, however, have experienced higher rates of electrification but lower rates of 
expansion in school, agricultural banks, and Grameen Bank.  Areas with excess rains 
attracted less electrification, Grameen Bank, and FFW programs, but more schools.  
 
Effects of policies on per capita income and expenditure 
Having established that agroclimate factors matter in policy and program placements, it is 
f the effects of agroclimate factors 
) 
 
                                                     
now important to estimate the effects of policies (M) net o
on seasonality income and poverty.  The results of the consumption model of equation (6.1
with added agroclimate variables for per capita total and food expenditures are presented in 
Table 12.
37   Using these consumption estimates we calculate and present also the estimated 
effects of selected policies on three types of poverty—moderate, food, and extreme poverty. 
A Hausman test is done to test if the FE or Random effect is appropriate for the model; the 
chi-square statistic clearly shows that the FE model is more appropriate in estimating 
equation (6.1).  A joint significance of all policy variables also show that these policies 
considered together is significant at 1 percent level.        
 
37 Even with this specification, it is possible that unobserved household level heterogeneity can influence the 
estimates.  Hope the bias is reduced by controlling the role of agroclimate and rainfall variables observed at the 
community or thana level. The bias due to unobserved household heterogeneity could be best dealt if we had a 
household level panel data.   
  31   To combat poverty, the most effective means are human capital investments.  T
results of Table 12 show that lack of human and physical
he 










s on poverty and seasonal food deprivation.  Households that have electricity 
structural and seasonal poverty as well as lack of consumption smoothing.  Thus, each 
additional year of education for the head of household increase total per capita expenditure
by 2.4 percent and food consumption by 1.1 percent per year reducing both moderate (
2.5 percentage points), food poverty (by 1 percentage point) and extreme poverty (by 3 
percentage points).  Consequently, public investments in secondary education infrastructure
will help increase consumption as well as reduce poverty.  Villages that have a secondary
school, for example, are likely to have extreme poverty reduced by 4.3 percentage points, 
and moderate poverty by 3.7 percentage points.  On the other hand, primary school 
presence helps reduce food poverty by 3.2 percentage points.   
   Both land and non-land assets have strong positive effects on consumption a
negative effects on poverty with much stronger of the two being
example, a one percent increase in land asset holdings reduces extreme poverty by 3.2 
percentage points, while a similar increase in non-land assets reduces extreme poverty b
12.8 percentage points. Therefore, a policy that stipulates asset transfers as a way to mit
monga will have more beneficial effects focusing on transfer of non-land assets than land 
assets.           
   Electrification has expected substantial positive effects on consumption and, henc
negative effect
are likely to have their per capita total consumption increased by 16.3 percent, and moderate 
poverty reduced by 14.6 percentage points, extreme poverty by 18.4 percentage points, and 
food poverty by 3.5 percentage points.  Electricity connection provides opportunities for 
both farm and non-farm income expansion, which ultimately helps increase consumption 
  32and thus reduce poverty and seasonal food deprivation.  On the other hand, irrigation help
enhance farm productivity and thus food consumption by 3.1 percents.  This in turn reduc
food poverty by 1.4 percentage points.  Public investments on physical infrastructure such as










emonstrate whether this is the case, the monga dummy is 
interacted with program variables such as Grameen Bank, FFW and VGF (results are not 
                                                     
38  
The presence of agricultural banks does not seem to have any significant effect on 
consumption and poverty.  But micro-credit programs, such as the Grameen Bank,
 total consumption (by 4.4 percent) and hence, reduce both moderate poverty (by 
4.5 percentage points) and extreme poverty (by 5.3 percentage points).
39 The Food for W
(FFW) program contributed substantially to overall per capita total consumption (by 6.9 
percents) and food consumption (by 7.5 percents) with consequent reduction of moderate 
poverty (by 7.3 percentage points), food poverty (by 3.2 percentage points), and extreme 
poverty (by 8.1 percentage points).  The FFW program is thus most appropriate for 
addressing seasonality both in income and consumption as well as containing seasonal and
overall poverty.  The Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) program also increases per c
total consumption and food consumption by 2.7 percents and 4.4 percents, respectively.  
This in turn reduces moderate poverty, food poverty and extreme poverty by 2.9, 2.0 and 3
percentage points respectively.  
Do some of these programs have differential effect during the lean season on 
consumption and poverty?  To d
 
38 Rural road expansion is another public investment that may have beneficial effects on poverty. However, 
HIES data does not provide information on rural roads.  But given that rural electrification or Grameen Bank 
expansion follows rural road expansion, the effects of electrification or Grameen Bank captures in part impact 
of roads.   
39 Given the estimated effect, this means 1.0 percent annual rate of extreme poverty reduction due to Grameen 
Bank with its village coverage as low as 23 percent in 2005. This finding is not different from the average 
estimated impact of micro-credit on village-level poverty using household-level panel analysis (see Khandker 
2005).    
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cy 
nd overall income and productivity as well 
as food
onsumption and income that causes food 
deprivation.  Households in an agrarian society face seasonality in income and consumption 
rt  cle in agriculture but they also learn how to manage seasonality through 
icates a 




here).  The results support that Grameen Bank and FFW have substantial 
contribution to both food and total consumption per capita during the lean season, showing
that these programs help smooth consumption.   
In short, monga is caused substantially by seasonality of agriculture; yet poli
interventions can be judiciously and selectively applied to reduce the intensity of both 
chronic and seasonal poverty by raising seasonal a
 and non-food consumption.       
     
7.    Discussion 
Monga is an acute form of seasonality in c
as pa of the crop cy
savings and other means.  When monga or seasonal food deprivation occurs, this ind
failure of the traditional means.  Monga is also a failure of public policies created to provide 
safety nets to manage seasonality and, hence, monga.   
   Household data analysis of HIES 2000 and 2005 suggests that seasonality in 
consumption is acute in certain months of the year and that seasonal variations vary 
substantially by region.  For example, overall consump
se l fluctuations in expenditures are much greater in Rangpur region than in othe
regions.  The relative fluctuation in consumption is also larger for extreme than non-e
poor and much more pronounced in greater Rangpur.  Levels of consumption are, in 
general, lower overall in Bangladesh during monga period (September-November) than o
seasons, but the shortfall is much more pronounced in Rangpur than in other regions.   
  34Econometric analysis confirms that the perfect consumption smoothing model is 
rejected and that seasonal variations in income substantially track seasonal consumption and 
poverty
ity or 





ivity for the poor but appears to have limited impact in mitigating monga, especially in 
Rangpur,  
.  Lack of income smoothing is therefore a major factor causing seasonal food 
deprivation in Rangpur.  Households likely resorted to traditional means (e.g., self-insurance, 
interfamily transfers, or borrowing from informal sources) to cope with extreme volatil
shortfalls in consumption.  But these traditional methods are certainly inadequate; otherwise, 
the incidence of monga would not have occurred every other year, especially in Rangpur in 
such a scale.      
Government institutions often employ short-term measures such as cash transfers, 
food-for-work, f
ption were only transient in nature and are idiosyncratic across households, these 
interventions if properly targeted could have helped mitigate monga.  However, mong
been a widespread phenomenon, which is caused by low income and low productivity – th
sources of chronic or structural poverty.  Interventions not geared toward enhancing inco
and productivity growth or programs not well targeted are not of much help in containing 
monga.  
Group-based lending is an approach geared toward enhancing income and 
product
 for a number of reasons.
40  First, micro-credit has failed in general to reach
hardcore or extreme poor who constitute the majority of monga-vulnerable households.  
                                                       
40 Pitt and Khandker (2002) found that one of the reasons for micro-credit program participation was to 
facilitate consumption smoothing. Households who are unable to smooth consumption are more likely to 
ss  participate in micro-credit programs.  Micro-credit tends to encourage income earning activities that are le
vulnerable to seasonality and thus helps borrowers to smooth consumption.  This observation appears less 
valid regarding micro-credit operation in Rangpur; had micro-credit been more successful, Monga would not 
have been so pronounced in Rangpur.  However, monga would have been affected by micro-credit but for 
poor agro climate, the presence and coverage of micro-credit including the Grameen Bank is low in Rangpur 
compared to the rest of the country.  
  35Second, micro-credit programs have no provision for stand-alone consumption loans to
smooth consumption when self-insurance does not work.  Third, the weekly repayment 
culture of micro-credit programs is at odds when pronounced seasonality limits the ability o
micro-credit agencies to support new loans during monga.  Finally, group-based lending 
works well when income variations are idiosyncratic so that group members may 
assist/insure other members during difficult times. But as seasonality is systemic during 
monga, affecting everyone within a group, the ability of mutual insurance is severely cu
and the group as a whole has a greater incentive to collude on a strategy of default.  Not 
surprisingly micro-credit programs such as the Grameen Bank have limited coverage in the
greater Rangpur district characterized by high aggregate income risk. 





icies and programs discussed above 
have so ing 
 
 suggest that targeted programs such as VGF have a negative effect 
on pov
er 
most affected individuals or households.   
me favorable impacts on seasonal poverty.  Micro-credit programs matter in reduc
poverty; yet only 7 percent of rural households have access to the Grameen Bank in Rangpur 
compared to 23 percent in other regions.  Access to micro-credit must be improved to 
mitigate poverty by targeting the hard-core poor not currently served with new products
appropriate for them.  
Our results also
erty, and it is good that the coverage of the VGF in greater Rangpur is higher (85 
percent) than in other regions (58 percent). While coverage of VGF is satisfactory in great
Rangpur, that of other programs (FFW for example) is very low (less than 30 percent). Yet 
we find that FFW has had some substantive impacts on poverty.  For sustainable benefits, 
the coverage, as well as scope, of these programs may be enhanced and focused toward the 
  36On a similar positive role, we note that asset transfer programs such as the Char 
Livelihood Project (CLP) as introduced by GOB with help from DFID is likely to affect the 
extreme ore 






 food consumption volatility in Rangpur.  Yet the asset transfer program seems m
effective for non-farm asset transfer than farm asset transfer.   
Non-targeted programs such as public investments in electrification, irrigation, and 
schools are expected to promote income and productivity of ru
m production, and therefore can help mitigate seasonal poverty such as monga.  Publi
investments in schooling, as well as irrigation, would attract further investments, which help
promote income and consumption in general and reduce poverty of all forms in particular.   
We conclude that if the policies were integrated and coordinated, the monga 
situation in Rangpur could have been much better like in other regions of Bangladesh.  
 officials must be aware of the fact that monga is not only seasonal but also an
outcome of high rates of extreme or hard-core poverty.  Therefore, policy interventions
must be both short- and long-term in nature.  A judicious use of short-term interventio
along with a long-term policy focusing on raising income and productivity would help 
diversify rural income and eradicate monga as well as structural poverty.  
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Table 1: Poverty lines by region 
Greater Rangpur  Rest of the country  
 
Whole sample  Poverty line 
(Tk./month) 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
Total poverty line  582.0  605.9 654.9 653.0 648.3 648.6 
Food poverty line  509.6 518.5 551.9 558.3 548.1 554.5 
Observations 440  520  4,600 5,520 5,040 6,040 





Table 2: Distribution of food poverty (FP) and extreme poverty (EP) by season (%) 
Greater Rangpur  Rest of the country   Whole country   Period 
2000  2005  2000 2005 2000 2005 




































Observations 440  520  4,600 5,520 5,040 6,040 






Table 3: District-level overall insecurity measures 
Greater Rangpur  Rest of the country   Whole sample  Insecurity measures 
2000 2005  2000 2005  2000  2005 
Moderate poverty headcount (%) 70.9  61.0  54.8  43.5 56.3 45.1 
Extreme poverty headcount (%) 60.9  47.9 39.9  29.4 41.8 31.1 
Observations 440  520  4,600  5,520 5,040 6,040 
Sources: HIES surveys, 2002 and 2005.           
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Table 4: Selected welfare indicators of rural households 
Greater Rangpur  Rest of the country   Whole sample  Indicators 
2000 2005 2000 2005  2000  2005 
Household indicators          
 













Per capita non-farm income (B) (Tk./month) 216.1 258.0 378.2 376.5  363.4  365.2 
Per capita non-earned income (C) (Tk./month) 130.3  72.0  235.8 294.5  226.2  273.4 
Per capita total income (A+B+C) (Tk./month) 616.3  648.3  902.2 927.3  876.1  900.8 
Share of seasonal crop income in total income  0.168  0.177 0.110 0.123  0.115  0.128 


























Per capita total expenditure (Tk./month) 541.6  630.4  740.5 875.7  722.4  890.2 
Access to electricity (%) 6.6  17.9  19.9  31.2 18.7  30.0 
Land asset (decimal)  82.0 123.7 84.3 152.6  84.1  149.9 
Access to formal credit (%)  6.4 7.1 9.6 9.3  9.3  9.1 
Community indicators          
 













Female wage (Tk./day)  31.0 37.0 48.2 43.1 46.6  42.5 
Extent of land irrigation (%)  78.3 81.2 59.0 59.8  60.8  61.8 
If community was affected by flood in last 5 
years (%) 
86.4 65.4 79.1 69.1 79.8  68.7 
If community was affected by river erosion in 
last 5 years (%) 
40.9 7.7 19.8  15.9 21.7  15.2 
If community has Grameen Bank  (%)  22.7 15.4 13.1 23.5  14.0  22.8 
If community has agricultural bank (%)  22.7  11.5  12.5 15.0  13.5  14.7 
If community has commercial bank (%)  27.3  19.2  17.5 19.5  18.4  19.5 
If community has Food-for-work program (%)  50.0  26.9  53.4 27.8  53.1  27.7 
If community has vulnerability group feeding 
program  (%) 
68.2 84.6 57.4 63.6 58.4  65.6 
Observations 440  520  4,600 5,520  5,040  6,040 
Note: Farm and non-farm income constitute household’s earned income, as they are receipts from active employment. On  
          the other hand, non-earned incomes are receipts from investments, assets, pensions, remittances, gifts/charities and  
          safety net programs. Safety net programs are VGD, VGF, IFS, FFW (money), Test Relief, GR, Money for  
          education, RMP, Old Age Pension, Freedom Fighters Pension, etc.   
          Figures in parentheses are share (%) of non-earned income. Monetary figures are CPI adjusted with base year 2000. 
 Sources: HIES surveys, 2002 and 2005.            
 
 
  43  
 
Table 5: Summary statistics of outcome and selected explanatory variables 
Variables 2000  2005  Panel 
HH variables 
 









































































Time-variant community variables 
 



































































Time-invariant community variables 
 





































Observations 5,040  6,040  11,080 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.  
Sources: HIES surveys, 2002 and 2005.           
 




2000 2005  Thana-level  Fixed  Effect 
  Total  Food   Total   Food   Total   Food  
































































































R2 0.196  0.202  0.327  0.204 0.403  0.203 




















Observations 5,040  5,040  6,040 6,040  7,640 7,640 
 
Note: Total income and consumption are expressed in log form. Income variables are treated endogenous and so   
           instrumented. Instrumental variables are community infrastructure (distance to district and thana HQ, presence of  
           schools, banks, NGOs and safety net programs) and agroclimate characteristics (rainfall, land elevation, average  
           number of sunny months, share of flood-prone areas and excess rain amount per month). Figures in parentheses  
           are t-statistics. Regressions include other household (head’s sex, age, education, and land and non-land asset) and  
           community variables (prices of consumer goods, daily wage, etc.). Sources: HIES surveys, 2002 and 2005.           
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Table 7: Test of bias due to exclusion of unmatched 2000 and 2005 thanas from panel analysis 
Outcome variables  F (or χ2)value  p>F (or p>χ2) 
Per capita total consumption from 2000 data   F(33,183)=1.25  0.182 
Per capita food consumption from 2000 data   F(33,183)=1.03  0.429 
Per capita total consumption from 2005 data   F(33,225)=0.79  0.787 
Per capita food consumption from 2005 data   F(33,225)=0.77  0.807 




Table 8: IV Estimates of per capita consumption for poor and non-poor households 
(FE-IV estimation with panel data: N=7,640) 
Selected explanatory variables  Per capita total consumption 




































R2 0.141  0.238  0.185  0.247 0.029 0.234 
  χ2 (1)=5.66, p>0.017  χ2 (1)=6.95, p>0.008  χ2 (1)=5.38, p>0.020 
  Per capita food consumption 


























R2 0.091  0.023  0.102  0.008 0.030 0.029 
  χ2 (1)=1.37, p>0.242  χ2 (1)=3.44, p>0.064  χ2 (1)=0.22, p>0.638 
Note: Total income and consumption are expressed in log form. Income variables are treated endogenous and so   
           instrumented. Instrumental variables are community infrastructure (distance to district and thana HQ, presence of  
           schools, banks, NGOs and safety net programs) and agroclimate characteristics (rainfall, land elevation, average  
           number of sunny months, share of flood-prone areas and excess rain amount per month). Figures in parentheses  
           are t-statistics. Regressions include other household (head’s sex, age, education, and land and non-land asset) and  
           community variables (prices of consumer goods, daily wage, etc.). χ2 test shows the equality of seasonal  
           income between poor and non-poor households 
Sources: HIES surveys, 2002 and 2005.           
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Table 9: IV Estimates of food and extreme poverty 
Selected explanatory 
variables 
2000 2005  FE-IV   






Food poverty  Extreme 
poverty 


























Seasonal crop income share 





















































Year* Greater Rangpur 
region 





R2 0.193  0.012  0.122  0.090 0.152  0.208 
Observations 5,040  5,040 6,040 6,040  7,640  7,640 
Note: Total income and consumption are expressed in log form. Income variables are treated endogenous and so   
           instrumented. Instrumental variables are community infrastructure (distance to district and thana HQ, presence of  
           schools, banks, NGOs and safety net programs) and agroclimate characteristics (rainfall, land elevation, average  
           number of sunny months, share of flood-prone areas and excess rain amount per month). Figures in parentheses  
           are t-statistics. Regressions include other household (head’s sex, age, education, and land and non-land asset) and  
           community variables (prices of consumer goods, daily wage, etc.). χ2 test shows the equality of seasonal  
           income between poor and non-poor households 




Table 10: Calculated poverty estimates based on FE-IV estimates of per capita consumption reported in Table 6 
         Note: Total income is expressed in log form.  
2000 2005  Panel  Income variables 
Moderate Food   Extreme  Moderate Food   Extreme Moderate  Food   Extreme
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Table 11: Impacts of agroclimate and distance variables on policy variables (thana level FE estimates, N=7.640)  








































































Average monthly rainfall 









































































































R2 0.038  0.168  0.372  0.045  0.0149 0.079  0.261  0.031 
Hausman test for suitability of 








p> χ2 =0.271 
χ2 (8)=6.90, 
p> χ2 =0.440 
χ2 (8)=5.85, 
p> χ2 =0.664 
χ2 (8)=15.87, 







Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  
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Table 12: Reduced-form FE estimates (thana level ) of policy and program placements on 
consumption and poverty 
Estimates of per capita 
expenditures 

































































































































R2 0.371  0.249  -  -  - 
Hausman test for suitability of FE vs. RE 
(χ2 and p>χ2) 
χ2 (38)=88.77, 
p> χ2 =0.000 
χ2 (38)=138.69, 
p> χ2 =0.000 
- - - 
Joint significance of policy variables 





   
Observations 7,640  7,640 7,640  7,640  7,640 
Note: Consumption variables are expressed in log form. Income variables are treated endogenous and so   
           instrumented. Instrumental variables are community infrastructure (distance to district and thana HQ, presence of  
           schools, banks, NGOs and safety net programs) and agroclimate characteristics (rainfall, land elevation, average  
           number of sunny months, share of flood-prone areas and excess rain amount per month). Figures in parentheses  
           are t-statistics. Regressions include other household (head’s sex, age, education, and land and non-land asset) and  
           community prices of consumer goods, daily wage, etc.,  community infrastructure (distance to district and thana  
           HQ, presence of schools, banks, NGOs and safety net programs) and agroclimate characteristics (rainfall, land  
            elevation, average number of sunny months, share of flood-prone areas and excess rain amount per month). 
Sources: HIES surveys, 2002 and 2005.          
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Table A1: First stage regression outputs for IV estimates   
Selected explanatory 
variables 
2000 2005  Panel 





































































































































































Village has any primary 













Village has any secondary 













Village has any agricultural 
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Table A1: First stage regression outputs for IV estimates  (continued) 
Selected explanatory 
variables 
2000 2005  Panel 










































































































































































































Average monthly rainfall 


































































Number of sunny months 
per year*year 




Proportion of high 
land*year 




Proportion of medium 
high land*year 




Proportion of flood-prone 
area *year 
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Excess rain per month 
(mm)*year 




R2  0.309  0.209  0.265 0.183 0.253 
 
0.165 
Observations 5,040  5,040  6,040 6,040 7,640 7,640 
Note: Figures in parentheses below the coefficients are t-statistics. 
 
 